Mechanismen institutionellen Wandels im deutschen Kapitalismus

In the debate on the convergence of Rhenish capitalism towards the Anglo-Saxon model there is a growing consensus on the emergence of hybrid institutional configurations which combine elements of both systems. Our paper traces the mechanisms and driving forces leading to varying degrees of convergence with Anglo-Saxon standards and institutions by comparing the changes in two areas of German corporate governance regulation, namely internal corporate governance and accounting. Whereas existing institutions were coupled with Anglo-Saxon elements in the case of internal corporate governance (?layering“), traditional standards and institutions were substituted for new ones in the case of accounting (?displacement“). We argue that the varying degree of convergence can be explained by the different preferences of key national actors, such as companies and trade unions, in the two cases and the varying exogenous pressures for reforms. Our study highlights the importance of a meso-level analysis of causal mechanisms for the explanation of institutional change in modern capitalism.