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Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games |
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| Authors: | Epstein Gil S. Hefeker Carsten |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Bar Illan University, Israel 2. CEPR, London 3. IZA, Bonn 4. Department of Economics (WWZ), University of Basel, Petersgraben 51, 4003, Basel, Switzerland |
| Abstract: | We analyze how the standardresults in lobbying theory change when one side has asecond instrument at its disposal. We look at theeffect concessions by one side have on the outcome ina Nash and a Stackelberg game. |
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