| Abstract: | The mutation of protean “street gangs” to insurgents illustrates that insurgents need not be ideologically oriented, and need not be traditional revolutionary fighters emerging from the mountains and jungles to take down or control a government. Rather, they may have their own specific commercial money-making motives, and can emerge out of the favelas, callampas, villas miserias, and pueblas jovenes (city slums) not so much to replace governments as to gain very lucrative freedom of movement and action within a supposedly sovereign national-state. Also, mature second and third generation gangs have been known to act as proxies and mercenaries for traditional nation-states that want to maintain “plausible deniability,” and to act as mercenaries for warlords, organized criminal organizations, and/or drug-trafficking cartels that—on certain occasions—need additional “fire-power”. The instability and lack of individual and state security generated by gangs phenomenon and their nefarious allies are also known to lead to the radical change of failed state status. In these terms, gangs are no longer a singular law enforcement issue. As crime and war become more and more indistinguishable, gangs must be considered a larger national security issue—that, paradoxically, must be viewed as a local concept. |
