| Abstract: | Information controls are actions intended to deny, disrupt, monitor, or secure information for political ends. They can be implemented using a wide variety of technical and nontechnical means. Political contests over the control of information are heightened around important events, such as major anniversaries, armed conflicts, protests, and elections. In this paper, we offer a comparative case study of online censorship of the circumvention tool Psiphon during the Iranian elections in 2016 and 2013, drawing on unique access to analytics data from Psiphon. We find that the Iranian regime developed its censorship approach in two ways, deploying blocking that was more targeted and strategically timed in the more recent case. Evidence suggests that the regime relaxed censorship of Psiphon during the official campaign period for the 2016 election. The apparent objective of this new approach was to control access to information while minimizing the political consequences of doing so. |
