Something old,something new: security governance in Iraq

The lack of a coherent security paradigm capable of explaining the concerns of both traditional and ‘new’ security is evident from the US-led occupation of Iraq. Security is the critical element in Iraq's reconstruction, and understanding the multiple meanings and relationships through which it is exercised is essential for empirical and analytical reasons, yet policy is flawed and the debate remains polarized. Thus Washington assumes that conventional security can be provided—and US power employed—independently of the relationship in which it is to be exercised, whereas Iraqi concerns focus on security at the level of the individual. The result can be seen in the paradigmatic examples of coalition operations in Basra in 2003 and Falluja in 2004. This article suggests that the interaction between coalition authorities and Iraqis, and, by extension, conventional and new forms of security, is best understood in terms of power relations; a comprehensive understanding of security must incorporate a relational dimension.