| 严打政策的政治经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈屹立. 严打政策的政治经济学分析[J]. 法制与社会发展, 2012, 0(2): 87-95 |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈屹立 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南政法大学经济学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 西南政法大学青年教师学术创新团队资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 利用虚拟变量法对严打政策的计量经济学研究发现,严打政策对暴力犯罪产生了显著的威慑效应,而且还存在着后续威慑效应。但对财产犯罪和总犯罪的威慑效应并不明显,这和严打的重点打击对象以及暴力犯罪的占比是有关系的。严打的威慑效应是严打长期存在的技术基础,官员面临的现有博弈格局和成本收益状况则是严打长期存在的根本原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 严打 威慑 政治经济学 |
A Political Economic Analysis of Strike-hard Policy |
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| CHEN Yi-li. A Political Economic Analysis of Strike-hard Policy[J]. Law and Social Development, 2012, 0(2): 87-95 |
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| Authors: | CHEN Yi-li |
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| Affiliation: | CHEN Yi-li (Economic School,Southwest University of Political Science&Law,Chongqing,401120) |
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| Abstract: | Using dummy variables we find that strike-hard policy has a remarkable deterrent effect to violent crimes,moreover also has the following deterrent effect,but is not obvious to the property crimes and total crimes.These results are related with the focus of strike-hard policy and the proportion of violent crimes.The deterrent effect of strike-hard policy is the technology base of its’ long-standing.The game pattern officials faced and the situation of cost-benefit are the fundamental reason of it’s long-standing. |
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| Keywords: | strike-hard deterrence political economy |
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