Secularism before the Strasbourg Court: Abstract Constitutional Principles as a Basis for Limiting Rights

The justification for the restrictions on religion inherent in secularism is the subject of lively debate in constitutional and political theory. As a rights‐focused text, the ECHR struggles to accommodate constitutional principles such as secularism whose aims and justifications may go beyond the protection of the rights of others and include abstract goals such as upholding the religious neutrality of the state. Rights alone cannot provide an adequate account of the relationship between religion, state and law, and in Ebrahimian v France, the Strasbourg Court rightly reaffirmed that secularism and strict neutrality can be in harmony with the values of the Convention. However, the Court needs more clarity about the reasons for this stance and to be vigilant in its protection of private autonomy so that the use of abstract principles to restrict religious expression does not give excessive latitude to states to restrict individual autonomy and minority rights.