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国家·制度·法——一个制度经济学的视角
引用本文:张韶华. 国家·制度·法——一个制度经济学的视角[J]. 行政法学研究, 2004, 0(4)
作者姓名:张韶华
作者单位:西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西,西安,710061
摘    要:在经济学的视野下 ,博弈工具论证了代表法律制度强制力的政府的出现降低了界定和保护产权的费用 ,从而使产权安排得到普遍的尊重 ,但政府并不是合约交易的前提 ,而是合约交易规模经济的结果。政府的出现也是一个交易活动的历史演变过程。博弈模型的继续扩展和现实运用 ,有助于对政府的类型及政府机会主义进行剖析 ,从而推导出契约论宪法观及法治的内核及意义。

关 键 词:政府  法律  制度分析  方法论

State· Institution· Law
ZHANG Shao-hua. State· Institution· Law[J]. Administrative Law Review, 2004, 0(4)
Authors:ZHANG Shao-hua
Abstract:From the perspective of Economics, the tool of Game expounds that the appearance of the government representing the coercive power of legal system reduces the cost for confining and protecting property rights, making the arrangement of property rights universally respected However, the existence of the government is not the prerequisite to a contractual transaction but the result of the latter The appearance of the government is an evolving process of transactional activity The expansion and practical application of the Game model is contributive to analyzing the type of the government and government opportunism, thus we can deduce the core and significance of the contractual constitutionalism and rule of law
Keywords:Government  Law  Institutional Analysis  Methodology  
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