Was erklärt politische Patronage in den Ländern Westeuropas? Defizite des politischen Wettbewerbs oder historisch-formative Phasen der Massendemokratisierung

Every major paradigm in the social sciences since the 1950s has offered its own explanation for the varying incidence of party patronage and political clientelism in modern democracies. Today the two main contenders are (RC-based) positive political economy and historical institutionalism. Positive political economy emphasizes the crucial importance of effective political competition as a control device against the ever present temptation for politicians to use ‘improper political practices’ like patronage or clientelism. Historical institutionalism highlights the importance of formative moments in the history of democratic mass mobilization and party formation. The article argues that both approaches suffer from considerable weaknesses. The article proposes a modified historical-institutionalist explanation, which emphasizes the importance of state formation rather than party formation and which explains varying degrees and different forms of political patronage in Europe with different paths of modern state-building.