Supreme auditing institutions: A politico-economic analysis |
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Authors: | Frey Bruno S. |
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Affiliation: | (1) Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zürich, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CN-8006 Zürich, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | While the beneficial aspects of a public accounting office's activity are not disputed here, it is argued in this article that four major distortions are produced: the concern with administrative rationality overlooks costs elsewhere (Section 2); budgetary aspects are overvalued compared to other issues (Section 3); incentives-oriented behavior is suppressed (Section 4); and the evaluation is biased by concentrating on minor, instead of major, aspects of inefficiency (Section 5). Section 6 considers alternatives to public accounting offices and makes some suggestions for new institutional arrangements particularly for constitutional rules. |
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