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Politicians: be killed or survive |
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| Authors: | Benno Torgler Bruno S. Frey |
| Affiliation: | 1. The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane, QLD 4001, Australia 2. CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Gellertstrasse 18, 4052, Basel, Switzerland 3. Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Wilfriedstrasse 6, 8032, Zurich, Switzerland 4. Warwick Business School, The University of Warwick, Scarman Road, Coventry, CV4 7Al, UK |
| Abstract: | In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. To investigate this phenomenon, rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using a large data set covering close to 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce the probability of politicians being attacked or killed: extended institutional and governance quality, democracy, voice and accountability, a well-functioning system of law and order, decentralization via the division of power and federalism, larger cabinet size and a stronger civil society. There is also support for a contagion effect. |
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