多次博弈背景下的中国特色刑事诉审关系-基于制度经济学的考察

我国刑事诉讼中，诉审双方通过多次反复的博弈，达成了现存的注重配合的非正式制度，而这种制度的稳定，依赖于双方建立在拥有博弈惩罚权基础上的相互实施。本文在剖析司法实践中诉审双方博弈惩罚权相互实施的基础上，分析了该制度实施中可能存在的例外情况及原因，并进一步阐述了非正式制度带来的强化诉讼线性结构、限制正式制度实施空间等后果。

The Relationship between Prosecution and Trail with Chinese Characteristics against the Background of Repeatedly Game Playing： From the Perspective of Institutional Economics

In criminal procedure, the present unofficial cooperation-oriented system is formed through re peatedly game playing between the prosecution and trial. The stability of this system relies on the mutual impli cation of the right to punish enjoyed by both parties in game playing. This paper analyzes the two parties＇ mu tual implication of the right to punish in judicial practice. On this base, the exceptional cases and reasons of the implementation of this system are studied. Moreover, further research is conducted on the consequences of implying the unofficial system, such as strengthening the liner structure of lawsuit, restricting the implementa tion space of official system, etc..