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我国国企高管薪酬的程序控制
引用本文:韩姗. 我国国企高管薪酬的程序控制[J]. 广西政法管理干部学院学报, 2011, 0(6): 113-117
作者姓名:韩姗
作者单位:浙江师范大学法政学院,浙江金华,321004
摘    要:在金融危机的背景下,众多国企高管动辄数百万、上千万的薪酬令人瞠目。“限薪”因此也成了热门的词语,然而限薪的背后,暴露出薪酬程序上的一系列瑕疵。高管薪酬之所以让社会公众质疑,既有薪酬内部制定问题,又有外部控制不力的原因。因此,要想控制高管薪酬,釜底抽薪的办法是从程序上加以控制,而不仅仅是数量上的限制。

关 键 词:国企  高管薪酬  限薪令  程序控制

The Procedural Regulation of Executive Compensation in State- owned Enterprise
HAN Shan. The Procedural Regulation of Executive Compensation in State- owned Enterprise[J]. Journal of Guangxi Administrative Cadre Institute of Politics and Law, 2011, 0(6): 113-117
Authors:HAN Shan
Affiliation:HAN Shan(Zhejiang Normal University,zhejiang Jinhua 321004)
Abstract:Under the global financial crisis, many enterprise executives own tens of millions, which have been staggering. Therefore "Limited Pay "became a popular word, however, it exposes series of slight defects in the compensation procedure behind limited pay. The reason why executive compensation make public questioned is not only the internal salary formulation , but also the external inadequate control. Therefore, the key approach to control executive pay is to be controlled from the procedure, rather than quantitative restriction.
Keywords:state- owned enterprise  executive compensation  pay limit order  procedural regulation
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