Fiscal Federalism and Provincial Foreign Tax Policies in China

This paper employs province-level data between 1992 and 2000 to assess the impact of fiscal federalism and pro-internationalization industrial groups on provincial foreign tax efforts in China. It argues that part of the provincial variation in tax efforts on foreign investors is related to the level of fiscal autonomy, the strength of pro-internationalization industrial groups, and provincial economic conditions. The level of fiscal autonomy is found to be positively associated with provincial governments' tax efforts on foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Transfer-dependent provinces tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs than transfer-contributing provinces. The transfer systems designed to combat regional inequality and absorb regional shocks may undermine incentives for local governments to be fiscally responsible, potentially resulting in over-consumption. In addition, provinces that have strong pro-internationalization industrial groups or disadvantaged economic conditions tend to have lower effective tax rates on FIEs.