The social construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN + 3

Slowly but steadily, a new international institution is emergingin East Asia: the ASEAN + 3 forum, comprising the ten membersof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China,Japan and South Korea. ASEAN + 3 is an interesting case of institution-buildingin that it is constructed around the core of an already existinginstitution, ASEAN, which was founded in 1967. The followinganalysis of this multilateral forum seeks to answer two theoreticalquestions: (i) Why do states cooperate? (ii) What happens totheir interests and identities once they communicate with eachother? In view of this task, I will offer a social constructivistvariant of international relations theory to explain the instigationof the process on the one hand and the processual constructionof the institution on the other. The underlying belief is thatnot only do states influence the development of internationalinstitutions, but that institutions can also exert influenceon foreign policy behaviour. The approach introduced here acknowledges that internationalreality is a social construction driven by collective understandingsemerging from social interaction. This approach to the explanationof the initiation and the subsequent development of an institutionrecognizes the existence of both material and normative groundsof foreign policy action. It differs from neoliberal institutionalismbecause in this theory as well as in realism collective interestis assumed as pre-given and hence exogenous to social interaction.In contrast, we suppose that social interaction ultimately doeshave transformative effects on interests and identity, becausecontinuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjectivemeanings. This method of analysis corresponds with Moravscik'stripartite analysis of integration decisions: while the initialphase refers to the formation of state preferences, the secondand third involve the dynamic aspect of ‘constructing’international institutions: the outcomes of interstate bargainingand the subsequent choice of the institutional design.