Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast‐growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings – one conceptual, one theoretical – in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal–agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the “orchestration” framework to ERNs we demonstrate that it better captures the specific characteristics of ERNs. Secondly, explanations for the choice and design of ERNs have treated functional and power‐based accounts as mutually exclusive. We argue instead that explanatory leverage can be gained by combining these two accounts by specifying their respective domains of application. While functional accounts enable us to illuminate why and under what circumstances ERNs are created in the first place (rather than EU agencies or delegation to the Commission), political accounts help us to shed light on variation in the design of ERNs (i.e. why actors opt for rather close or loose network structures). We illustrate the explanatory value‐added of such an approach through two brief case studies on EU telecommunications and competition policies.