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  Mexico's Collective Action ClauseMeetings, amendmentsand waivers   To meet or not to meet: Gabon and GhanaCommittees return: from Hungary to Georgia, via Abu DhabiICMA Model Creditor Committee Clause•] Noteholders’CommitteeUnanimity revival  

Innovation after the revolution: foreign sovereign bond contracts since 2003
Authors:Gelpern  Anna; Gulati  Mitu
Institution:*Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, Rutgers and Duke Law Schools.
Abstract:The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points
  • In 2003, under official pressure, amendment provisionsin standard form New York law sovereign bond contracts shiftedto resemble English law boilerplate.
  • Market participants andofficials expected contracts in New York and London to convergearound a common formulation.
  • Contrary to expectations, theshift away from old boilerplate did not lead to convergencearound new boilerplate.
  • Issuers in London, and to a lesserdegree in New York, are experimenting with diverse terms andinstitutional arrangements.
  • Amendment provisions in recentissues have used hybrid formulations, permitting holders tovote in person or by written consent, with different approvalthresholds.
  • More issuers are using trust structures.
  • Creditorcommittees are making a qualified comeback, though the adoptionand formulation of committee provisons does not appear to trackissuers' credit quality.
  • Not all issuers agree to pay committeeexpenses.
  • Some issuers have agreed to require unanimous creditorconsent to amend litigation-related terms, . . . Full Text of this Article]
 
   1. Introduction: theory's poster children    2. Boilerplate in flux    3. Conclusions: innovation questions
Keywords:
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