Innovation after the revolution: foreign sovereign bond contracts since 2003 |
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Authors: | Gelpern, Anna Gulati, Mitu |
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Affiliation: | *Anna Gelpern and Mitu Gulati, Rutgers and Duke Law Schools. |
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Abstract: | The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points- In 2003, under official pressure, amendment provisionsin standard form New York law sovereign bond contracts shiftedto resemble English law boilerplate.
- Market participants andofficials expected contracts in New York and London to convergearound a common formulation.
- Contrary to expectations, theshift away from old boilerplate did not lead to convergencearound new boilerplate.
- Issuers in London, and to a lesserdegree in New York, are experimenting with diverse terms andinstitutional arrangements.
- Amendment provisions in recentissues have used hybrid formulations, permitting holders tovote in person or by written consent, with different approvalthresholds.
- More issuers are using trust structures.
- Creditorcommittees are making a qualified comeback, though the adoptionand formulation of committee provisons does not appear to trackissuers' credit quality.
- Not all issuers agree to pay committeeexpenses.
- Some issuers have agreed to require unanimous creditorconsent to amend litigation-related terms, . . . [Full Text of this Article]
| 1. Introduction: theory's poster children | Mexico's Collective Action Clause Meetings, amendmentsand waivers 2. Boilerplate in flux | To meet or not to meet: Gabon and Ghana Committees return: from Hungary to Georgia, via Abu Dhabi ICMA Model Creditor Committee Clause [] NoteholdersCommittee Unanimity revival 3. Conclusions: innovation questions |
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