| Abstract: | This article examines the administrative process which led to the construction of 160,000 prefabs between 1946 and 1948. The links of industrialists with government, the influence of Churchill, the rivalry between the key Ministries of Works and Health, and an influx of enthusiasts for prefabrication into the administration, all had their part to play in the adoption of the prefab programme. Implementation, however, involved unforeseen delays and expense, and a major unintended consequence was a move against increased centralization of public house-building. The prefab programme was one of the first examples of the dangers of relying on technology as a solution to housing shortage, but the manner in which this badly planned and expensive panacea made its appearance also illustrates how far policy-making in practice falls short of the ideal 'rational' model. Instead of choosing between conflicting policy options the wartime government preferred to pursue a number of them simultaneously. |
