A Political Economy Perspective of Judicial Review in the European Union: Judicial Appointments Rule, Accessibility and Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice |
| |
Authors: | George Tridimas |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) School of Economics and Politics, University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey Co, Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK |
| |
Abstract: | The paper examines the benefits the sovereign member states of the EU expect to derive by granting the European Court of Justice the power to review the collective policy making decisions of the EU legislative bodies. Using the methodology of constitutional political economy it investigates the one-country one-judge rule of judicial appointments in the ECJ, the restrictions imposed on litigants to access the ECJ and the limits on the jurisdiction of the ECJ to review EU legislation. It also analyses how the presence of judicial review affects the size of the policy measures taken by the policy makers. |
| |
Keywords: | European Court of Justice constitutional political economy judicial review judicial appointments accessibility to court jurisdiction of court independent judiciary |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|