相互制约:联盟管理的核心机制

内容提要:本文主要探讨联盟管理过程中盟友之间互动的动态机制。通过归纳和推理,笔者发现,联盟维持和管理的机制是相互制约,两个变量——盟友之间的权力对比和意图匹配程度——通过相互制约的核心机制影响联盟的命运。按权力对比,联盟可以区分为对称性联盟和非对称性联盟;按联盟内部的国家意图,联盟可以区分为防御性联盟和进攻性联盟。这样,将至少有四个理想型联盟,每一个理想型联盟都存在自身特有的互动动态。总的来说,在对称性联盟中,若盟友意图一致,则彼此相互制约易于成功,联盟容易管理;反之,则不易管理。在非对称性联盟中,只有当强国为防御性现实主义国家而弱国为进攻性现实主义国家时,相互制约才相对困难,联盟才较难管理。文章以第一次世界大战前的法俄联盟、20世纪中叶的中苏联盟以及20世纪50年代之后的美日联盟作为案例,对本文提出的联盟管理理论进行验证。

Mutual Binding:Central Mechanism of Alliance Management

This article mainly considers the interactive dynamics at play between allies in the management of alliances.Through induction and deduction,the author finds that the main mechanism maintaining and managing alliances is mutual binding.Alliances can be divided into two types according to relative power:symmetric alliances and asymmetric alliances.Based on objectives of the parties to an alliance,they can be divided into defensive and offensive alliances.In this way,there are at least fourideal typesof alliances.Generally speaking,for symmetric alliances,if the objectives of the allies are the same,the mechanism of mutual restrain will function properly,and the alliance can be managed with relative ease;should the objectives be different,the converse is true.For asymmetric alliances,mutual restraint functions,and the alliance is not difficult to manage except when the more powerful state is a defensive realist state,while the weaker state is an offensive realist state.The article uses the cases of the alliance between France and Russia before World War I,the alliance between China and the USSR at the end of the 20th century,and the alliance between the United States and Japan since the 50s to test the proposed theory of alliance management.