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姓名权本质变革论
引用本文:袁雪石.姓名权本质变革论[J].法律科学,2005,23(2):44-51.
作者姓名:袁雪石
作者单位:中国人民大学法学院 北京100872
摘    要:单纯认定姓名权是人格权观点存在的缺陷。姓名的社会功能决定了姓名权的本质。等级社会中的姓名具有表明等级关系的功能 ,姓名可以成为身份权的客体。在市场经济条件下 ,姓名用于体现社会评价和指代特殊事物 ,姓名因此分别成为人格权和财产权的客体。先占理论、功利主义理论和人格理论可以成为作为财产权的姓名权的理论基础

关 键 词:姓名权  身份权  人格权  财产权
文章编号:1671-6914(2005)02-0044-(08)
修稿时间:2004年7月5日

On the Revolution of the Nature of Right of Name
YUAN Xueshi.On the Revolution of the Nature of Right of Name[J].Law Science (Journal of Northwest Institute University of Politics and Law),2005,23(2):44-51.
Authors:YUAN Xueshi
Institution:YUAN Xueshi
Abstract:The idea that the right of name is a kind of the right of personality is limited. The social functions of the name ascertain the essence of the right of name. In the hierarchical society, the name held the functions of differentiating the individual and the status, and it could become the object of the right of paternity. In the market economy society, the name is used to embody the social evaluation and regarded as a symbol of particular thing. Therefore, the name becomes the object of the right of personality and that of property. The theory of preoccupation, the theory of utilitarianism and the theory of personality can be the foundations of the theory that the right of name is a kind of the right of property.
Keywords:right of name  right of paternity  right of personality  right of property
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