Persuasion, slack, and traps: how can economists change the world? |
| |
Authors: | Bryan Caplan |
| |
Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Center for Study of Public Choice, and Mercatus Center, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030, USA
|
| |
Abstract: | Contrary to my critics, voter irrationality does not imply that economists cannot mitigate political failure. With rational voters, reform-minded economists have few viable tactics; with irrational voters reformers have more options. Rational voters can be swayed only by facts and logic; irrational voters could respond to better rhetoric. Rational voters strategically punish those who ignore their policy preferences; irrational voters use less effective disciplinary strategies that create political slack. Even with irrational voters, efficiency-enhancing reform is hard. With rational voters, however, democracy’s failure to adopt a reform is strong evidence that the reform does not enhance efficiency. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|