UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BARGAINING FOR ADOPTION ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS |
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Authors: | Mary Eschelbach Hansen Daniel Pollack |
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Affiliation: | Economics, American University, Washington;Yeshiva University's School of Social Work in New York City and Senior Fellow, Center for Adoption Research, University of Massachusetts Medical School, Worcester, MA |
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Abstract: | Families that adopt children who are in foster care may receive monthly adoption assistance payments to offset the cost of raising the adopted child. The amount of the adoption assistance payment is the subject of bargaining between the family and the child welfare authority. This article uses a bargaining model to highlight factors that, in addition to the expected costs of raising the child, might influence the outcome of bargaining over adoption assistance payments. Findings indicate that married parents who adopt children already in their care have an advantage in bargaining, and single women who adopt their kin or foster children have a disadvantage in bargaining. |
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Keywords: | adoption adoption assistance payment child welfare |
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