Over‐commitment and backsliding in international trade

‘International commitments pay’ could be the mantra of the current literature on international organisations: tying their hands at the international level is a means for governments to push through politically costly, but ultimately welfare‐enhancing reforms. It is argued in this article that this logic has a limit, which can be empirically observed. Past a given point, further depth of integration increases odds of backsliding. This belief is tested in the context of accession to an institution whose rules have been heavily scrutinised: the World Trade Organization (WTO). Countries with low rule of law are imposed a risk premium in the form of demands for deeper concessions, making ‘over‐committing’ possible. This relationship is used to assess the extent to which deeper commitments lead to backsliding. Industry‐level analysis supports these beliefs: deep commitments lead to increased odds of backtracking through a range of legal and extra‐legal mechanisms. Ambitious international commitments can backfire.