Moral Convictions Often Override Concerns About Procedural Fairness: A Reply to Napier and Tyler |
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| Authors: | Linda J. Skitka Elizabeth Mullen |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Chicago, m/c 285, 1007 W. Harrison St., Chicago, IL, USA;(2) Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA |
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| Abstract: | Napier and Tyler (this issue) question whether moral convictions about outcomes really override the influence of procedural fairness (PF) on fairness judgments and decision acceptance. The empirical answer to this question is “yes.” When people have strong moral convictions about outcomes, perceptions of outcome fairness and decision acceptance are primarily shaped by whether the morally “correct” outcomes are achieved. Pre-decision perceptions of PF have surprisingly little or no effect on these judgments. That said, pre-outcome perceptions of PF sometimes predict post-outcome perceptions of PF, even when people have morally vested outcome preferences. We provide further details supporting the validity and superiority of our data analytic approach and argue that our original conclusions were justified. |
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| Keywords: | Morality Moral mandate Justice Fairness Procedural fairness Procedural justice Outcome fairness Obedience to authority |
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