WHY A COMMITMENT TO A RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE REDISTRIBUTION THROUGH TAXATION AND WELFARE PROGRAMS： SCRUTINIZING NOZICK＇ S ENTITLEMENT THEORY OF JUSTICE

This paper critically examines Robert Nozick＇s theory of right and property with its corollary critique of redistributive taxation and welfare programs, as presented in his seminal book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia （hereinafter ASU）. In opposition to Nozick, this paper argues that a commitment to a right to liberty and property does not preclude, in and of itself, the acceptance of redistribution through taxation and welfare programs. Indeed, the thesis attempts to show that Nozick＇s ASU version of libertarianism itself requires, and is grounded in, a commitment to the value of welfare programs funded through redistributive taxation. More specifically, the paper contends that in accepting the Lockean proviso, with its concomitant egalitarian premises into his theory, and in making the plausibility of his argument rest on the proviso, Nozick has already infected his own libertarian views with just the same sort of redistributivism and welfarism he vehemently impugns. Consequently, the paper concludes that Nozick＇s contention against redistribution via taxation and welfare programs is ultimately self-refuting, if not hypocritical. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to showing why welfare liberals should not be intimidated or dismayed by Nozick＇s theory of property right. Rather, welfare liberals should regard Nozick as a theoretical ally, since Nozick＇s libertarian entitlement theory comes perilously close to transmogrifying into the ＂welfare state ＂.