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Rational inattention and politics: how parties use fiscal policies to manipulate voters
Authors:Murtinu  Samuele  Piccirilli  Giulio  Sacchi  Agnese
Affiliation:1.Utrecht University, Adam Smith Hall, Kriekenpitplein 21-22, 3584 EC, Utrecht, The Netherlands
;2.Universitas Mercatorum, Piazza Mattei, 10, 00186, Rome, Italy
;3.Department of Economics, Society, Politics, University of Urbino, Via Saffi 42, 61029, Urbino, Italy
;
Abstract:Public Choice - We model a two-party electoral game with rationally inattentive voters. Parties are endowed with different administrative competencies and announce a fiscal platform to be credibly...
Keywords:
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