Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting |
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Authors: | Haldun Evrenk Dmitriy Kha |
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Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 02108, USA
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Abstract: | We study the effects of stochastic (probabilistic) voting on equilibrium locations, equilibrium vote shares and comparative statics in a setup with three heterogeneous candidates and a single-dimensional issue space. Comparing the equilibria with and without stochastic voting, we find that under an appropriate level of uncertainty about voter behavior, the model has a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium (PSNE) that is free from several non-plausible features of the PSNE under deterministic voting. This result is robust to extensions to asymmetric density and plurality maximization. |
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