Elections and the strategic use of budget deficits |
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Authors: | Roland Hodler |
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Affiliation: | 1. Study Center Gerzensee, 3115, Gerzensee, Switzerland 2. Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3110, Australia
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Abstract: | We present a model in which a conservative incumbent with preferences for low public spending can strategically run a budget deficit to prevent the left-wing opposition candidate from choosing high public spending if elected, and possibly also to ensure his own reelection. We find that the incumbent never manipulates the opposition candidate??s public spending if he can ensure his own reelection; and that a conservative incumbent who runs a budget deficit to ensure his reelection may somewhat paradoxically choose high public spending before the election. |
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