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Imposing a turnout threshold in referendums
Authors:Yoichi Hizen  Masafumi Shinmyo
Affiliation:1. Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University, North 9, West 7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, 060-0809, Japan
2. Graduate School of Public Policy, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
Abstract:We construct a model of a yes/no referendum for which the outcome is valid only if the voter turnout rate is greater than a predetermined value. With such a turnout threshold, three types of equilibria exist, in each of which the voters who favor the status quo either go to the polls, abstain, or use mixed strategies. We show that abstaining is more likely to realize the status quo than going to the polls if the threshold is sufficiently high, whereas one of the mixed-strategy equilibria is least likely to realize the status quo for any level of threshold.
Keywords:
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