| Abstract: | In late twentieth-century federal systems, provinces and stateshave sought greater autonomy because of economic neglect, distinctivenessof society and political culture, administrative inefficiency,and local efficacy. This article examines both structural andpolitical avenues to autonomy in six stable democratic federalsystems. In general, structural attempts to increase provincialor state autonomy in federal systems are found wanting. Becauseamendments to federal constitutions require extraordinary majoritysupport, they tend to centralize power. Referenda may be usedto retard centralization only under exceptional circumstances.Secession has been a successful strategy in only a small numberof cases. Political strategies, such as judicial interpretationof the constitution and conferencing, have been somewhat moreeffective; but political system characteristics impose restrictionson their use. Two types of decentralization that apply universally—devolutionand deconcentration—appear to enhance powers of subnationalunits. However, they require significant facilitating conditionson the national plane. The article calls into question the practicalvalue of structural arrangements, suggesting that alternatepolitical strategies sometimes produce more decentralized effects. |
