Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government |
| |
Authors: | Garoupa, Nuno Klerman, Daniel |
| |
Affiliation: | Nuno Garoupa, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and Daniel Klerman, University of Southern California Law School |
| |
Abstract: | This article analyzes public and private law enforcement whenthe government is motivated by rent seeking. A rent-seekinggovernment seeks primarily to maximize revenue. The articleconcludes as follows: (1) if offenders have sufficient wealth,a rent-seeking government is more aggressive than a social-welfare-maximizinggovernment in enforcing laws against minor crimes (such as parkingviolations) but more lax in enforcing laws against major crimes;(2) competitive private enforcement is usually better and neverworse than monopolistic private enforcement; (3) The choicebetween competitive private enforcement and public enforcementdepends on which is cheaper and on the severity of the offense. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 Oxford 等数据库收录! |
|