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North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information |
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| Authors: | A Caparrós J-C Péreau T Tazdaït |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Institute of Economics and Geography (IEG), Spanish Council for Scientific Research (CSIC), 28006, Madrid, Spain 2. OEP, University of Marne-la-Vallée, Cité Descartes, Marne la Vallée Cedex 2, France 3. CNRS-EHESS-CIRED Jardin Tropical, 94736, Nogent sur Marne Cedex, France |
| Abstract: | This article determines the conditions under which theSouthern countries should act together, or separately, whilenegotiating with the North about climate change policy andabout the conditions for future Southern engagement. The papermodels the international negotiations with complete and withasymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results showthat, depending on their characteristics, the differentplayers can obtain benefits delaying the moment of theagreement. |
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