Agenda Power,Executive Decree Authority,and the Mixed Results of Reform in the Brazilian Congress |
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| Authors: | CARLOS PEREIRA TIMOTHY J. POWER LUCIO R. RENNÓ |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Michigan State University and S?o Paulo School of Economics, Funda??o Getúlio Vargas;2. Carlos Pereira <3. >4. is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, 303 South Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, and also Assistant Professor at the S?o Paulo School of Economics, Funda??o Getúlio Vargas.;5. University of Oxford;6. Timothy J. Power <7. is University Lecturer in Brazilian Studies and a fellow of St. Cross College at the University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6JF, UK.;8. University of Brasília;9. Lucio R. Rennó <10. is Associate Professor at the Research Center and Graduate Program on the Americas (CEPPAC), Universidade de Brasília, Multiuso II, piso 01, 70910‐900 ‐ Brasilia–DF, BRAZIL. |
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| Abstract: | This article examines how institutional change in the use of extraordinary legislation affects delegation of power and unilateral action in new democracies. From 1988 to 2001, Brazilian presidents were able to reissue decrees indefinitely and thus had substantial legislative power. In 2001, Congress amended the constitution so as to restrict the president to a single reissue of each lapsed decree. This reform has had mixed results: although it ended the practice of infinite reissues, it induced Presidents Cardoso and Lula to use more decrees than previous executives had. Presidential agenda power, rather than being reduced, has been sharpened. By analyzing patterns of presidential initiatives from 1995 to 2005, we demonstrate the mixed results of this constitutional reform. |
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