Intended Consequences: Jurisdictional Reform and Issue Control In the U.S. House of Representatives |
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| Authors: | E. SCOTT ADLER JOHN D. WILKERSON |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of Colorado;2. E. Scott Adler <3. >4. is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309‐0333.;5. University of Washington;6. John D. Wilkerson <7. is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Washington, Box 353530, Seattle, WA 98195. |
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| Abstract: | The power of congressional committees rests in large part on their ability to set the legislative agenda in particular issue areas. But how do committees acquire their issue jurisdictions? Existing research points to informal committee turf wars— not collective reforms—as the roots of jurisdictional allocations (King 1994, 1997). Yet the House of Representatives has made nearly 150 formal changes to its committees' jurisdictions since 1973. We investigated the effects of one prominent instance of extensive jurisdictional changes, the Bolling‐Hansen reforms of 1975, and found that this body of reforms advanced collective goals of improved policy coordination and enhanced information sharing. |
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