Agenda Power in the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2000 |
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| Authors: | GARY W. COX WILLIAM B. HELLER MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS |
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| Affiliation: | 1. University of California, San Diego;2. Gary W. Cox <3. >4. is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at University of California, San Diego, SSB 390, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093‐0521.;5. Binghamton University (SUNY);6. William B. Heller <7. is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Binghamton University (SUNY), Binghamton, NY 13902‐6000.;8. Mathew D. McCubbins <9. is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at University of California, San Diego, SSB 392, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093‐0521. |
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| Abstract: | We present strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly 0, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties' roll rates, which average about 20% on all final‐passage votes. Second, after one controls for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree‐conversion bills and budget bills than on ordinary bills—results consistent with our theoretical analysis of the differing procedures used in each case. |
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