| 信息不对称下公务员考录的机制设计 |
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| 作者单位： | 同济大学经济与管理学院，上海公共行政与人力资源研究所 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文运用信息经济学理论来解释和分析在公务员考录过程中存在的信息不对称问题,如逆向选择、道德风险和"学历高消费"等。针对这些信息不对称问题,本文提出:保证政府部门能经济、有效地吸收录用广大社会优秀人才,一方面,要在职位分类的基础上,建立分类分级考试制度和实行专业技术岗位聘任制以克服逆向选择问题;另一方面,设计合理有效的考试录用机制,大力加强政府部门的信息化工作,扩大考任制实施范围等以减少道德风险和"学历高消费"的问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 信息不对称 公务员考录 机制设计 |
A Design Mechanism for the Civil Service Examination and Hiring System under Information Asymmetry |
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| Authors: | Zhang Chuyun is a PhD Candidate at School of Economics and Management Tongji University Shanghai Sun Yuchun is a Professor at School of Economics and Management Tongji University Shanghai |
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| Institution: | Zhang Chuyun is a PhD Candidate at School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,Sun Yuchun is a Professor at School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092 |
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| Abstract: | This paper advances an analysis of information asymmetry issues,such as adverse selection,moral hazard and high consumption of qualifications,in the process of civil service examination and hiring.How to resolve these problems The article points out three ways.First,government should set up a classified exam system based on job classification to overcome the problem of adverse selection.Second,government should enhance the information work to reduce moral risks.Third,it should expand the range of hiring positions. |
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| Keywords: | information asymmetry civil service examination and hiring system mechanism design |
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