Instability and Oil: How Political Time Horizons Affect Oil Revenue Management

While economic explanations for the “resource curse” are well established, the political factors explaining why governments fail to take corrective action remain poorly understood. Research demonstrates that if governments save oil profits abroad and slowly re-introduce the oil-generated revenue into the domestic economy once the rate of return on investment is greater at home than abroad and the quality of project implementation developed, many of the economic problems that plague oil-rich countries can be avoided. Political time horizons shape the incentives of governments to pursue this strategy. Unstable leaders rely on oil revenue to maintain positions of power. They also have less incentive to save oil windfalls abroad as they fear they will not be in office long enough to benefit from such decisions. This paper uses both quantitative data and case study analysis of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to demonstrate that leaders with longer time horizons save a greater proportion of oil windfalls abroad than their less stable counterparts, helping avoid the economic pitfalls of oil abundance.