The Personal Nature of Individual Criminal Responsibility and the ICC Statute

By affirming criminal responsibility of the individual, theICC Statute recognizes a distinction from the internationalresponsibility of states, which is the basis of modern internationalcriminal law. The importance of the principle is evident notonly in the breadth and analytical nature of the provision dealingwith it, i.e. Article 25 of the Statute, but by its being placedin the part of the Statute devoted to the ‘General Principlesof Criminal Law’. After an introductory considerationof the context of the Article and of its general implications,this article analyses the contents of the regulation and thetype of responsibility outlined in it. The principle that emergescould be called the ‘personal nature’ of internationalcriminal responsibility. Although the general principles setout in the ICC Statute are rather rudimentary in comparisonwith what is to be found in the ‘General Part’ ofmost national criminal laws, the principle of personal responsibilityemerging from the Statute is nevertheless in the best traditionsof criminal law. It serves both as the foundation and as thelimitation of international criminal responsibility, so helpingto ensure that modern international criminal law is not a toolfor oppression but rather an instrument of justice.