Constitutional Review in the Mega‐Leviathan: A Democratic Foundation for the European Court of Justice |
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| Authors: | Quoc Loc Hong |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Law Faculty, University of Antwerp;2. Postdoctoral Fellow, Law Faculty, University of Antwerp, 2007–2009. I would like to thank Professor Maurice Adams, Professor Johan Meeusen and Professor Anne‐Marie Van den Bossche for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this article. My thanks also go to this journal's anonymous reviewers for their incisive suggestions. |
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| Abstract: | The European Court of Justice (ECJ) serves, among other things, as a constitutional court for the EU. This means that it possesses the legal right to strike down both EU and national laws it deems irreconcilable with treaty provisions. In the present article, we shall draw on Hans Kelsen's theory of democracy to argue that the ECJ's competence to review and invalidate legislation is, in fact, indispensable for the democratic legitimacy of the EU's legal system as a whole. |
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