| Abstract: | Many of the environmental laws enacted by Congress employ adistinctive blend of national and state authority. In theseconjoint arrangements, state authority is not totally preempted,but it is subordinated to national authority if states wishto participate in environmental regulation. Under normal circumstances,national and state authority are deployed concurrently in pursuitof environmental policy objectives. Conjoint arrangements aremuch more controlling of state action than the stimulative andfacilitative approach to intergovernmental program implementationcommonly associated with cooperative federalism. Despite nationalprimacy, in the bargaining that marks implementation processes,state officials may enjoy considerable influence. Although administrativelycumbersome and criticized from a variety of perspectives, conjointarrangements are not the major reasons for a slow rate of improvementin environmental quality. When the various options are considered,there are reasons to conclude that conjoint arrangements arethe most realistic means for attacking environmental problems,although questions remain about the appropriate balance of nationaland state authority in them. |
