Negative Externality of Fiscal Problems: Dissecting the Contagion Effect of Municipal Bankruptcy

The fiscal decision of one local government may spill over to other localities, and such externality could justify and inform policy making by a higher‐level government. Theories of municipal bond market contagion postulate that once a local government files for bankruptcy, localities sharing similar characteristics will be perceived negatively by creditors and charged a higher interest rate. In this article, empirical examination of the second‐largest municipal bankruptcy in American history shows no support for general contagion based on geographic proximity. That is, nearby localities did not pay a higher interest rate after the bankruptcy. However, case‐specific contagion formed around borrower‐ and bond‐specific characteristics contributing to the bankruptcy: general‐purpose borrowers and general‐obligation bonds experienced increased borrowing costs after the bankruptcy. These findings have implications for states considering granting authorizations for municipal bankruptcy or providing financial assistance to struggling localities, as well as for local governments planning to access the municipal bond market.