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惩防体系的软肋:国企腐败的制度依赖性透视
引用本文:毛昭晖.惩防体系的软肋:国企腐败的制度依赖性透视[J].廉政文化研究,2010,1(2):27-33.
作者姓名:毛昭晖
作者单位:中国人民大学,公共政策研究院,北京,100872
摘    要:国企腐败是中国最大的腐败。政治与经济双重体制的逆向挤压是国企腐败高发的动因。一方面,国家对国有企业的监管依旧是以行政化手段为主,自上而下的公权力对国有企业起到决定性作用,而国企正是依赖这种公权力,获得民营企业无法企及的超额垄断利益。另一方面,国有企业具有市场经济主体的属性,在国家监管、社会责任与公益目的极度弱化的情况下,多元化的经济行为和经营方式又成为其谋取私利的重要途径。瓦解国企强势既得利益集团谋利行为在于分类监管。公益性类企业的监管模式应当摒弃市场化监管手段,实行以政府监管为主、社会民主监督为辅助的监督模式;对竞争性国企应确立“非禁即准入”原则,建立国有资产退出机制。从根本上说,国企腐败治理关键在于瓦解国企腐败所依赖的制度环境,以全面改革代替局部改革,以制度创新代替制度修补。

关 键 词:惩防体系  国企腐败  分类监管

The Weakness of Anti-corruption System:On the System Dependence of Corruption in State-owned Enterprises
MAO Zhaohui.The Weakness of Anti-corruption System:On the System Dependence of Corruption in State-owned Enterprises[J].ANTI-CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY CULTURE STUDIES,2010,1(2):27-33.
Authors:MAO Zhaohui
Institution:MAO Zhaohui(Academy of Public Policy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872,China)
Abstract:Corruption in state-owned enterprises is the most serious corruption in China. As the consequence of the double political and economic impact,the corruption there appears at a high rate. On one hand,administrative means being applied as the main methods in supervision,the top-down government authority plays a decisive role in state-owned enterprises. Depending on this power,they possess the excess oligopoly profits which can't be obtained by civilian-run enterprises. On the other hand,as a main part of the ...
Keywords:anti-corruption system  corruption in state-owned enterprises  categorized supervision  
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