The Contradictions of Rational Abstention: Counterfinality,Voting, and Games without a Solution*

This paper considers the theory of rational abstention from the angle of Elsrer's categories of social contradictions. It is demonstrated that Downsian expected utility maximizing voters will be trapped in a state of counterfinality, which is one of these categories. Realizing this, citizens may alter their behavioral assumptions, and come to base their decisions on strategic thinking. However, this leads into another contradiction in Elster's sense, since in general, the Voting Game has no solution. The latter conclusion is shown to hold true regardless of the number of candidates involved, and irrespective of the number of rounds in the election. The lesson to draw is that neither Bayesian decision theory nor the theory of games can provide satisfactory advice for the rational citizen in voting situations, and, by implication, decision criteria other than those offered by these theories may be of some relevance However, several possible criteria exist, and unless satisfactory predictions can be made as to how the various criteria are distributed in the electorate, the theory must remain indeterminate as far as predictions of voter turnout are concerned.