Predation enforcement options: an evaluation in a Cournot framework |
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Authors: | Kai Hüschelrath Jürgen Weigand |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department for Industrial Economics and International Management, L7,1, ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, 68161, Mannheim, Germany 2. WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179, Vallendar, Germany
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Abstract: | The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce anti-predation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent. |
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