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Voters and coalition governments
Authors:Sara B. Hobolt  Jeffrey A. Karp
Affiliation:1. Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UQ, UK;2. Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, Devon EX4 4QJ, UK
Abstract:Coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary democracies. Yet, despite the predominance of this type of government, political scientists have only recently started to investigate how voters approach elections when a coalition government is the likely outcome. Such elections present additional uncertainty and complexity for voters compared with elections in plurality systems, where party choice translates more directly into a choice of government. These factors have lead to the assumption that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in systems that produce coalition governments. In this introductory article to the special issue on Voters and Coalition Governments, we consider whether voters have the capacity to anticipate specific coalition outcomes and propose a framework for understanding the conditions that lead to strategic voting in both plurality and proportional systems.
Keywords:Coalition governments   Electoral systems   Prospective voting   Retrospective voting   Sincere voting   Strategic voting
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