北洋政府时期预算权的宪法配置

北洋政府时期中央政府与议会在预算权方面的博弈,为探讨宪法如何恰当配置预算权提供极佳切入点.预算权的宪法配置及其实践折射出当时立法与行政机构的相互关系和地位,也揭示出宪政发展状况与阻力之所在.整体而言,当时预算权的宪法配置处于失范状况,原因在于宪法秩序不能有效建立,宪法对预算权配置不合理,国会立法迟延以及当时政治斗争极端化,缺乏将妥协作为政治的必然组成部分.这些经验教训给当代中国带来的启示是：实现有效预算的前提在于“民主”和“权力制衡”,建立独立于政府的审计机构,立法机关向独立化、专职化和民选化转变以及培育宪政社会的基础.

Constitutional Apportionment of the Budget Power During the Early Republic of China

The interaction between the central government and the congress in respect of the budget power during the Early Republic of China provides a perfect approach to discuss how the constitution may properly apportion the budget power. The constitutional apportionment of the budget power and its practice reflects the interrelation and position of congress and government and their respective status then, as well as the development of the constitution and its obstacle. Generally, the constitutional apportionment of budget power functioned badly in practice, owing to the fact that the constitutional order was not effectively established, the constitution didn＇t reasonably apportion the budget power, the deadly delay of legislation in Congress and the extreme political battle then, which excluded compromise as the essential component of politics.