Contracts,promises and meaning the question of intent

Conclusion In this article, I have argued against an intentionalistic theory of promises, such as the theory of Searle, and of others inspired by him. Such a theory leads to a one sided approach, and is unable to account for all the phenomena that count as promises. I have argued that in contract law both the promissor and the promissee play a role of importance, but also that the influence of their intentions is rather limited. I have then extrapolated my argument to extralegal promises.In the last section, I have offered some conjectures as to what may have contributed to the intentionalistic aspect of Searle's theory. My last conjecture was that the ambiguity of the word meaning may play a role. Let me end, in all modesty, by offering a suggestion that might help English philosophers in solving the problems of linguistics, and their translators in interpreting their solutions: the introduction of the word speaning for speaker's meaning!