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Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants
Authors:Stein  William E
Institution:1. Department of Information and Operations Management, Texas A&M University College Station, TX, 77843-4217, USA
Abstract:This article considers a rent-seeking model with N asymmetriccontestants. Each contestant may have a different valuation ofthe rent or a different relative ability to win the rent. Oneof the N contestants is selected as the winner based onTullock's probabilistic contest rule with constant returns toscale. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution is obtainedand its consequences are investigated.
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